Secure container transport

Security in the transport of goods has always been a problem. In the old days, guards armed with spears and swords were employed to look after wagon trains full of goods. Today, more sophisticated techniques are required to ensure that they do not fall into the wrong hands.

A container full of high-tech, high value and highly saleable equipment like mobile phones these days represents a rich haul for anyone with criminal tendencies. The techniques for getting hold of it vary, from straightforward theft (often of the entire container together with its contents) to trickery and fraud. In this article we will explore some of the techniques used by professional criminals for stealing cargo, and those used by carriers and shippers for preventing them.

The problem with today's trend towards setting up continuous supply chains and seamless cargo flows is that the professional criminal will always find the weak points in the system, and it is extremely difficult to ensure that security is checked all along the chain. The large-scale theft of whole container loads has become a highly organized and skilful business, using state-of-the art computer technology, logistics techniques and detailed knowledge of the goods targeted.

This means that the legitimate owners and conveyors have to develop even more sophisticated and cunning techniques to protect their cargo.

One of the most common methods of stealing a container is simply to hijack the truck carrying it. This is a favorite in many regions, and especially in Latin American countries such as Guatemala, or Mexico, where carriers try to protect their shipments by having trucks traveling in convoy and employing armed guards. Sometimes they even change to an alternative mode of transport; APL, for example, stopped trucking so many of its intermodal goods through the Laredo TX gateway into Mexico and started shipping them to Mexico City via the port of Manzanillo and double stack trains some time ago. But even then, there have been cases of whole container trains being held up near the USA-Mexican border.

Or there is the bogus official method, commonly known as the jump up, where somebody with a white coat and a clipboard stops the truck just short of the depot that is the destination and redirects the driver somewhere else. This is well-known in the UK and also in the CIS states and Russia, where there are even cases of bogus premises being set up complete with letterhead, logo and everything. And the thieves certainly take full advantage of the driver's inability to speak the local language. Or they quietly cause a slow puncture and helpfully advise the driver to go down the road on foot to a friendly local garage, which does not exist, and then disappear with the booty.

Another common method is to steal the truck when it is unattended (the driver's usual excuse is "I only left it here for the night so I could get an early start in the morning..."). The thieves often know exactly what their target is, and have teams of watchers in place with cellular telephones. They strike as soon as the driver has gone to have a meal or a shower, either absconding with the truck or stealing the goods out of the container and resealing it. The USA in particular has a problem with this. There are also more and more cases of drivers being physically attacked, which is a particularly worrying trend.

High-tech consignments are not the only ones at risk. The TT Club in London recently reported the case of two containers full of cosmetics, which disappeared from the premises of a US port (not identified) in the five days between being discharged from the ship and collection by the truckers. There was only one clue: two days previously a security guard noticed that the lock on a recently discontinued gate had been changed. This theft was definitely an inside job: the containers can only have been removed from the import stack and mounted on chassis on the day of discharge with the terminal's own equipment and then moved out through the disused gate later. Comparatively low-value goods can also be a target, for example, shipments of jeans or anything else that is difficult to trace and easy to dispose of.

A typical trick used by container thieves is to use forged documents to obtain release of the containers from ports or container yards. The container terminal at the port of Durban had this problem last year, with a different trucker's name on the documents presented from that on the original. The problem was solved in the interim by tightening up verification procedures, with a view to transferring the whole process to computer as soon as possible. Most ports, understandably, are reluctant to admit to having problems with security, but in fact most of them have, according to Andrew Trasler of the TT Club. More often than not, security at gates and procedures are in place, but then not observed, he said.

Surveys by Pinkerton Security Services and other organizations show that most fraud is committed by a haulage firm's own staff. This can be due to staff members being bribed or intimidated, or already having criminal records and not being adequately screened on being hired. Sometimes it is the importers themselves who arrange the theft to reduce their own costs. There are also organized gangs who go as far as training some of their members in logistics so that they can be hired by the unfortunate company who is next on their hit-list; they can then tamper with the bills of lading or other documentation as required. Moreover, these people can obviously be useful in organizing the rapid disposal of the goods.

However, having spies is not the only way of gaining information on the contents of a container and its movement through the supply chain. There are also increasing numbers of hackers (technically known as crackers) who earn a living by breaking into computer networks to gain access to this sensitive information. An unprotected network is regarded as a soft target, and billions of dollars are being spent on securing computer systems.

Container thefts do not necessarily involve stealing the container itself. A group of criminals that has the time and resources will take a container and cut a hole in the side or the roof of the container to remove some or all of the contents. The hole is then rewelded and painted over, looking like a bad repair, and the seal, which is designed to show if the container has been tampered with, remains totally unbroken. Or they remove the rivets holding the doors on, and replace them afterwards. When the theft is discovered at the destination, there is no clue as to when or where the theft occurred.

A more popular method of stealing the contents of the container is to break the seal and replace or mend it afterwards. There are all kinds of ways of ensuring that the seal appears intact: one of the latest is the twin-seal trick, used by drug-smugglers between Colombia and the USA, where a second blank seal is obtained in advance, imprinted with the right number and used to re-seal the container. Or the seal (or lock) is glued together and the evidence covered up with grease and dirt. Sometimes the whole of the contents of the container are stolen and replaced with bricks, concrete or barrels of water; opportunist thieves (who are rarer) tend to take only part of the goods, with the result that the consignee thinks he has been short-shipped rather than robbed.

There are various techniques for deterring and detecting organized crime in this field. They can range from exact documentation procedures for releasing goods and ingenious locks and seals for containers to the employment of security guards and technical aids such as closed-circuit TV (CCTV) cameras, and also detective agencies. The general aim is to prevent the theft in the first place, or detect the crime as fast as possible with a view to recovering the goods.

Security services like Pinkerton are attacking the problem on several fronts. One is the total solutions approach, where security is provided for all weak links in the transport chain and a global operations network is set up, with cross-border alliances between companies providing security services.

A container full of computer hard-disc drives is worth about USD 16 million, so computer equipment is particularly vulnerable. This summer saw a move by leading computer manufacturers to set up a new loose-knit organization in the USA called the Technology Asset Protection Association (TAPA) to prevent the theft of electronics, or any other high-value product, in transit by developing strict guidelines to improve security at weak points. Mutuals like the TT Club also emphasize the importance of identifying and remedying the causes of habitual losses, and regularly issue advice and organize seminars on this subject.

The last line of defense is obviously a form of lock or seal on the container itself, with some providing more of a physical barrier than others. Seals do not prevent entry but are designed to be difficult to open and close without leaving evidence of tampering. A popular seal is the shipping line specific seal, which is in the colours of the shipping line and easy to spot if replaced with another seal. Or there are seals with a plastic covering which changes colour if tampered with.

However, there has been an increasing trend towards using locks or high-security barrier seals in the last few years. Bolt types like the Enforcer, made by the US company Transport Security, or the Navalock, made in Japan, are popular and effective, and new and stronger versions are being developed. There is also a new company called Sealock Security Systems, Inc. which has developed the Sealock Security System, a light-weight product made of a combination of modern materials and incorporating the container seal as an integral part of the system. According to Ray Fernandez of Sealock Security Systems, the system has already been approved for military use in the USA and is finding favor with prominent organizations such as Lloyd's of London and Chubb.

An effective new device for the detection of theft from a container is the Spector, which consist of a photo-electric cell and a clock. It is put into the container and set at the last moment before the box is sealed, and is triggered by light, recording the time and date when the doors are opened. It was developed by the marine surveyor D.S. Oliver of Durban, and has already proved its worth in leading to the apprehension of thieves of precious metals being shipped from South Africa to Europe. A multiple entry version was launched on the market recently, which can record up to fifty events and be used in connection with CCTV cameras and other surveillance equipment. In this connection, it should perhaps be emphasised that recording the exact time of a theft is extremely important in insurance claims, since pinpointing the when and where of the crime is essential in identifying who bears liability.

Another interesting development which should act both as a deterrent and as an aid to detection is tag technology, an electronic tag fixed to goods, which enables an operator to see exactly where his goods are, worldwide, on a hand-held unit. Successful trials have already been carried out, and it should soon be possible to have the alarm raised within the first thirty minutes of a theft, for speed is essential if goods are to be recovered.

The American Trucking Association is trying to combat crime by setting up the Cargo Theft Information Process System (TIPS) which acts as a clearing house for information on stolen freight. As for the hackers, Pinkerton made an alliance with Science Applications International Corp in 1996 to detect computer intrusions before the onset of damage.

In conclusion, one can only comment that the amount of money being spent and the strenuous efforts being put into developing security systems for containers amply demonstrate the truth of the old saying that necessity is the mother of invention. Companies that go bankrupt as a result of theft, accounting for 33% of all company bankruptcies in the USA, according to Pinkerton, would also certainly agree that prevention is better than cure.

The Sealock incorporates the seal as an integral part of the container securing system. This is the second in a series of three articles on safety and security in container handling.

 Reprinted from: International Transport Journal, September 18, 1998